University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

2011

Partner Capture in Public International Organizations
Christopher G. Bradley
University of Kentucky, cgbradley@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Bradley, Christopher G., "Partner Capture in Public International Organizations" (2011). Law Faculty
Scholarly Articles. 574.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/574

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Partner Capture in Public International Organizations
Notes/Citation Information
Christopher G. Bradley, Partner Capture in Public International Organizations, 44 Akron L. Rev. 261 (2011).

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/574

PARTNER CAPTURE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
*

ChristopherG. Bradley

I. Introduction: "Partner Capture" and the Changing Face
of International Organizations ....................
II. The Rise of Partnerships: Private Money and
........................
Organizational Change
.......
III. Problems of "Partner Capture" ............
.....
...................
A. Agenda Distortion
.................
Rivalries
B. Intra-Organization
........
C. Reputational Risk.................
D. Erosion of Legal Immunity ..................
IV. A Proposal: The Office of Independent Review ..............
.....
...........................
V. Conclusion

261
263
273
276
285
290
293
295
301

I. INTRODUCTION: "PARTNER CAPTURE" AND THE CHANGING FACE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the last decade, public-private partnerships-jointly funded and
executed collaborative projects between public international
organizations and private corporations or foundations-have
proliferated. Cash-strapped international organizations find donors'
offers of aid irresistible, and donors have discovered that working with
experienced and respected "public international organizations" (that is,
international organizations answerable primarily or exclusively to public

* Postgraduate Research Fellow, University of Texas School of Law. A.B., Princeton; D.Phil.,
Oxford; J.D., LL.M. (International Legal Studies), New York University. I am grateful to Rachel
Barkow, Rebecca Bers, Sara Bronin, Jessie Brown, Simon Chesterman, Kristina Daugirdas, Chad
Flanders, John Golden, Benedict Kingsbury, Michael Livermore, Colin Marks, Paul Monteleoni,
Doug Wilson, the late Thomas Franck, and the scholars and fellows of the Furman Academic
Program at the N.Y.U. School of Law, for helpful comments. Thanks as well to the excellent staff
of the Akron Law Review.
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entities, usually states1 ) offers significant logistical and symbolic
benefits. While this trend has been recognized, and some concomitant
accountability and legitimacy concerns have been noted, legal
scholarship on the rise of international public-private partnerships
remains scant. Worse, the organizations have failed to set up adequate
safeguards against capture by partners whose interests may not align
with those of international organizations and their members or
constituents. Taking lessons from U.S. administrative and regulatory
law, this Article outlines the need for-and a workable proposal forsuch safeguards. It focuses on the United Nations (U.N.), the most
visible and universal of public international organizations. But this
Article's framework applies to other organizations, such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, subject to this danger-a
danger that this Article coins the term "partner capture" to describe.
The Article unfolds in four parts.
Part I discusses the changes that public-private partnerships have
wrought on the landscape of international organization funding and
describes, as an example, the expanding partnership activities of the
The U.N. recently established an Office for
United Nations.
Partnerships, which grew out of a decade of extensive contact with Ted
Turner's U.N. Foundation.2 The U.N.'s experience illustrates the
importance partners can have, not simply on specific projects but also in
bringing large-scale structural change to organizations.
Part II unpacks the concept at the heart of this Article: partner
capture. Drawing on principles of bureaucratic behavior and political
economy familiar from the U.S. administrative law context, Part II
identifies problematic aspects of the U.N.'s current partnership
activities. It notes the inadequacy of current accountability structures to
deal with partner capture problems, and it shows that the stakes are
sufficiently high that the U.N. and other public international
organizations should aggressively address partner capture.
Part III proposes an institutional solution for the U.N. It then
argues that such a solution could be implemented in other organizations,
to ensure that partnerships serve the interests not just of private partners
but also of organizations and their members or constituents. More

1. For this customary terminology and on public international organizations as distinct
objects of study, see Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 1-57

(2005).
2. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Office for Partnerships: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, Summary, U.N. Doc. A/62/220 (Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Office for Partnerships 2007
Report], availableat http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/A 62_220_Aug2007.pdf.
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specifically, an independent review bureau within the U.N. Office for
Partnerships-roughly on the model of the U.S.'s Office of Management
and Budget and various Inspectors General-should be created. The
proposed Office of Independent Review would provide both
retrospective evaluation and prospective guidance, independently
assessing partnership initiatives proposed or already undertaken by U.N.
entities, with the goals of developing best practices, guarding against
agenda distortions, and monitoring for abuse by partners and their
agents.
Part [V concludes by noting that new approaches such as those
suggested by this Article form an important part of an ongoing, and
healthy, expansion of the sources and structures of international law.
Traditional international law doctrines and theories are inadequate to
describe and organize the activities of quickly expanding networks of
public and private entities operating across national borders. Drawing
on domestic analogues with a long history in theory and practice
furnishes one promising avenue for the development of effective legal
solutions to new and complex problems.
II. THE RISE OF PARTNERSHIPS: PRIVATE MONEY AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Public and private entities have long acted in partnership,3 but on
the international level, a swift and sharp increase in collaboration can be
dated to September 18, 1997. On that date, American media mogul Ted
Turner announced his intention to make a huge donation to the U.N.up to one billion dollars, to be made in ten annual gifts of about one
hundred million dollars each.4
3. This fact is particularly notable in the domestic policy sphere. For an account and critique
of the growth of certain types of partnerships, including public funding of privately-run prisons and
schools, see Martha Minow, Public and PrivatePartnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARv. L. REv. 1229 (2003). She concludes with a recommendation in accordance with the
conclusions of this Article: "Rather than trumpeting privatization or marching against it, scholars
and activists should demand closer study of the strengths and weaknesses of existing accountability
mechanisms that govern private markets, governmental bodies, and nonprofits, as well as of the new
opportunities and dangers posed by collaborations across these sectors." Id. at 1262-63.
4. U.N. Secretary-General, UnitedNations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary General, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A153/700 (Nov. 24, 1998) [hereinafter UNFIP Preliminary
Report], available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/relationship__a-53-700.pdf. The most
substantive discussion of the Foundation's activities to date remains Stacy Williams' prescient Note,
A Billion DollarDonation: Should the United Nations Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth?, 27 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 425 (1999) (concluding, with some caveats, that it should not). As she explains,
Turner could not donate directly to the U.N. because such contribution is contrary to the U.N.
Charter. Id. at 435-36 (citing U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2, art. 3, art. 4, para. 1).
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Turner's gift-which represented a large contribution even by the
standards of the United Nations, the world's most important
international organization, and a relatively well-funded one 5 -attracted
considerable press attention and a quick response from U.N. officials.
Within months, Turner established the United Nations Foundation
(Foundation), organized as a charity under U.S. law, to receive and
administer his gift.6 The Foundation acted in concert with the U.N.'s
Secretary-General and Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions to establish a dedicated "interface" organization for
Turner's Foundation.7 This interface organization was and is called the
U.N. Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP). A formal agreement
between the Foundation and the U.N. sealed this basic relationship, and
the parties agreed on initial procedures for distribution of Foundation
funding.9
Turner's announcement came at a propitious time for the U.N.,
which was in the grips of a financial and political crisis.10 Its largest
donor-state, the U.S., had been withholding dues for partisan political
Following this
reasons, and stood over one billion dollars in arrears.
lead, other member-states refused to remain current on dues, and the
lack of financial support threatened to hamper the organization's ability
to accomplish its mission-and thus to exacerbate its political
problems.
Turner desired to support the U.N.'s substantive work, but he also
intended his gift to be used to advocate for the U.N. both in the United
States and abroad.' 3 Through the gift, Turner asserted that the U.N.

5. The Foundation's total gifts each year have amounted to slightly less than ten percent of
the core U.N. operating budget, although this budget is supplemented by numerous special
programs and assessments. MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 133 (2004) (reporting
"U.N. System Expenditures").
6. See I.R.C. 501(c)(3); UN. Foundation, THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND,
http://www.unfoundation.org/donate/cerf.html ("As a 501(c)(3) public charity, contributions made
to the UN Foundation are tax deductible for U.S. donors.") (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
3, 6.
7. UNFIP PreliminaryReport, supra note 4,
8. Id. Summary. The original name of the fund was the "United Nations International
Partnership Trust Fund." Id.
9. Id. Annex. The agreement was signed on June 12, 1998. Id. T 13.
10. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 135-36.
11. Id. ("In the late 1990s, the U.N. faced by far its most serious financial crisis.... The
United States was by far the biggest debtor, owing $1.6 billion. The financial crisis ... illustrated
the tension between demands for governance and institutional weakness.").
12. See id.at 135-37.
13. UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS 7 (2003)
[hereinafter U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS].
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deserved to be taken seriously, and, more subtly, indicated that donating
to and through it might bring some of the benefits major philanthropists
seek-including easy publicity, the infrastructure and experience crucial
to interventions in troubled regions and on large scales, and enough
normative legitimacy to cover more flexible, free, and aggressive project
design.' 4
As they have from the start, Turner and his close associates wield
immense power through the Foundation. The Foundation is run by a
Board of Directors and a small executive staff; Timothy Wirth, former
Representative and Senator from Colorado, has served as the first and
only President of the Foundation,1 5 and Turner remains the Chairman of
the Board.16 Even aside from his preeminent place in the institutional
structure of the Foundation, Turner's continued importance to the
venture is assured because he is not legally bound to continue providing
the funding he has promised to the Foundation.' 7 The initial plan to
offer ten annual gifts of one hundred million dollars each would have
brought Turner's role in bankrolling Foundation activities to an end in
14. See Inge Kaul, Exploring the Policy Space Between Markets and States: Global PublicPrivate Partnerships,in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 231

(Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceicao eds., 2006) (discussing some benefits of working with public
organizations, including: "economies of scale," "visible impact," "a delivery network in place,"
"protect[ing] the company against the potential risks," and "reputation spillover" ("[b]eing seen as
an accepted peer of a respected public actor in a sustained partnership [which is] . . . an effective,
relatively low-cost way of signaling social or environmental concern")). Kaul comments, regarding
this last reason:
Partnering with a public agent may ... confer a social license to operate on the private
corporation. This motivation undoubtedly explains the increase in private to public
contracting out of projects in which private agents lack the support of local communities,
as is the case with many oil companies and other corporations in the extractive
industries.
Id.
15. Timothy E. Wirth, Disinfectants, Nudes, and Other Adventures, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 15, 15 n.aal (2002).
16. U.N. Foundation, ABOUT UNF, OUR BOARD, http://www.unfoundationorg/about-unflourboard (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
17. It is of course conceivable that a remedy sounding in contract or promissory estoppel
might be available against Turner if he failed to pay promised sums, especially on a specific project
where a partner had relied on promised Foundation funding. But I have found no document
suggesting he is bound to pay up to the overall goals, and his statements on the subject seem
sufficiently conditional, at least on his continued financial success, that the pledge seems likely
more a moral than a legal obligation. (Indeed, as noted, Foundation funding has already changed
significantly in its substance from the initially announced gift structure.) See Mary Francis Budig et
al., Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations: Are They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27
U.S.F. L. REv. 47, 51-85 (1992) (outlining various theories of the "enforceability of charitable
pledges" from case law and secondary sources, noting ongoing doctrinal confusion, but tentatively
identifying a trend toward enforcement of promises that meet certain conditions, even in absence of
consideration or reliance, on public policy grounds).
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Now he is
2008, but as this cutoff approached, his strategy shifted.
highly "leveraging" Foundation funding with donations from other
partners, so that his remaining donations (he has given just under seven
hundred million dollars so far19) can be spread out over another ten
years.
Thus, Turner retains close control over the Foundation. It could be
characterized as a charitable alter ego of Turner, not meaningfully
separate from him, subject only to the minimal legal constraints required
for charitable organizations to maintain tax-exempt status. In this way,
the Foundation resembles the Gates Foundation, in that not just the
founder's wealth but also the founder's (or in the case of Bill and
Melinda Gates, the founders') vision remains crucial to the foundation's
activities.20 There is nothing particularly surprising, and certainly
nothing perverse, about this arrangement. Both the U.N. Foundation and
the Gates Foundation are widely recognized as responsible, professional,
and in many ways exemplary;21 the impact of their ten-figure
contributions to global issues is impressive and enduring. In addition,
their transparency regarding decisionmaking and finances and their use
of evaluative mechanisms for assessing the effects of their activities22
are admirable compared to most foundations. They have helped
establish a high bar for best practices in major, internationally-oriented
But caution is warranted when instead of simply
philanthropies.
donating their own money, they influence the policy decisions and

18. Caroline Preston, Ten Years Later, Turner's U.N. Fund Continues to Evolve, CHRON. OF
12, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutionsfiles.org/pdflarticles/cp_6122008.pdf.
19. Id. at 1-2.
20. Editorial, What has the Gates FoundationDone for Global Health?, 373 LANCET 1577
(2009) (criticizing the Gates Foundation's lack of transparency in goal-setting, as the organization is
dominated by the "whimsical governance principle" of following Gates family preferences).
21. They maintain and publicize their relatively transparent finances, they submit themselves
to independent evaluation, and they espouse an ethos of responsiveness to criticism. See, e.g.,
UNFJP PreliminaryReport, supra note 4, Annex. Even so, further scrutiny remains of utmost
importance, all the more so because, as one expert puts it, "the new ethos of openness has obscured
to some extent serious critical evaluations of foundation performance. With their tremendous
resources directed outward [i.e., to project a professional, objective, and competent image],
foundations now control their image more fully than ever before. . . . [Olpenness and
professionalism hardly guarantee that foundation resources are being used effectively and
Peter Frumkin, Private Foundations as Public Institutions: Regulation,
creatively."
Professionalization, and the Redefinition of Organized Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPIC
FOUNDATIONS: NEW SCHOLARSHIP, NEW POSSIBILITIES 69, 94 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann ed.,
1999).
22. See, e.g., UNFIP PreliminaryReport, supranote 4, Annex.
PHILANTHROPY, June
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dramatically rearrange the priorities of public international organizations
such as the U.N.
The Foundation's U.N. liaison, UNFIP, operates under some
supervision by the U.N. UNFIP is run by a Board of Advisors appointed
by the Secretary-General and chaired by a Deputy Secretary-General.23
The Board consists of U.N. officials and a few independent members
24
from academia, foundations, and development organizations. As with
other U.N. agencies, UNFIP faces occasional audits, and its programs
remain subject to U.N. accounting guidelines.25 Its operations were
once subject to criticism by the U.N. Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (interestingly, the criticism
came out in favor of less procedural caution in grant decisions). 26it
provides yearly reports to the General Assembly. Recently, a new
overarching entity, the U.N. Office for Partnerships, has emerged to take
over the role of general partnership-liaison office for the U.N., a role
previously played by UNFIP.27 And because the Office for Partnerships
appears to be taking on more of the general partnership work once
coordinated through UNFIP,28 it may develop increased supervisory
capacity over UNFIP. But for the moment, the two organizations seem
hardly distinct at all, sharing significant staff and functions. (This
Article's proposed Office of Independent Review could be housed in the
Office for Partnerships, and because the partnership office seems to be

Board,
Advisory
Partnerships:
for
International
Fund
U.N.
23. See
http://www.un.org/partnerships/YAdvisoryBoardPage.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
24. Id.
25. See U.N. Secretary-General, FinancialRegulations and Rules of the United Nations:
Secretary-General'sBulletin, U.N. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9,2003).
26. U.N. Secretary-General, UnitedNations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary General, 1 41, U.N. Doc. A/58/173 (Aug. 18, 2003) [hereinafter UNFIP Fifth Year
Report] (The ACABQ "observed that UNFIP's monitoring process appeared to be onerous and
bureaucratic and that the time had come to assess and streamline the whole process."), available at
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/fifthA-58-173.pdf.
27. The first report issued in the name of the Office for Partnerships explained its evolution as
a function of the unexpected success of the partnership model initially established by Turner's
philanthropy. Office for Partnerships2007 Report, supra note 2, 1 1 ("[O]wing to the success of
UNF[P partnerships activities and Robert E. Turner's philanthropic donation which paved the way
for increased private sector engagement in United Nations causes, there has been an increasing
demand for partnership advisory services by the Organization, State and non-State actors. This has
led to the evolution of the United Nations Office for Partnerships, which manages UNFIP, UNDEF
as well as Partnership Advisory Services and Outreach."). Id. The Office for Partnerships did not
release a report at all in 2009, or thus far in 2010; at the time of writing, the 2007 report, released in
2008, remains the most recently available report.
28. See U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Office for Partnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, 63, U.N. Doc. A/63/257 (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report], available at
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/english.pdf.
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currently evolving, the timing is right for the introduction of new,
structural accountability mechanisms such as this Article proposes.)
Thus, despite these forms of rudimentary oversight, both UNFIP
and the Office for Partnerships hold enviable positions. Their work is
done under color of the full authority of the U.N., but both have been
almost entirely delegated the authority to make tactical or operational
decisions concerning their partnerships, subject to a mere shadow of
possible correction.
As far as strategic goals, the mandate of the Foundation/UNFIP
partnership was strikingly broad from the beginning-to support "U.N.
causes."2 This is a practically limitless mandate given the wide scope
of U.N. activities. The Foundation decided that its key focus areas
would be "children's health, women and population issues,
environmental protection, and human rights/conflict prevention," 3 0 and
these remain its top priorities. Within these categories, it has developed
narrower "programme frameworks" to describe the types of initiatives it
is likely to support.
Despite the amount of money involved,
decisionmaking apparently remains relatively informal. Foundation and
UNFIP officials vet proposals from U.N. agencies and other partners,
and the Foundation's Board makes final funding decisions.
U.N.
agencies have aggressively pursued Foundation funding from the start,
and the process is competitive. 33 As the direct liaison within the U.N.
system, UNFIP secures the movement of funds from the Foundation to
agencies and other implementing entities, as well as insuring financial
accountability from funding recipients. 34

29. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 7.
30. Id. at 13. The final area, involving humanitarian aid and conflict prevention, developed
latest and was only gradually formalized. See UNFIP Fifth Year Report, supra note 26, T I
(describing this area as an "evolving strategy").
31. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/54/664/Add.2 (Mar. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Population
and Woman Program Framework] (offering the framework for the "Population and Women"
initiative).
32. The Secretary-General, United Nations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, T 48, U.N. Doc. A/57/133 (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter UNFIP Fourth Year
Report].
33. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, United Nations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships:
Rep. of the Secretary General, 13, U.N. Doc. A/55/763 (Feb. 5, 2001) [hereinafter UNFIP Third
Year Report], availableat http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/thirdyear a-55-763.pdf.
34. U.N. Secretary-General, UnitedNations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, 54, U.N. Doc. A/60/327 (Nov. 15, 2005) ("As the administrative vehicle in the
United Nations to support grant-making by the United Nations Foundation, UNFIP is responsible
for approving the project documents submitted by United Nations implementing partners,
requesting annual contributions for projects from the United Nations Foundation and making cash
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Even early on, "the Foundation consider[ed] ... raising new
funds . . . among its primary activities," 35 and spoke of "leveraging

The Five-Year Report of the Foundation
additional resources."
asserted that from the first meetings, a "new kind of philanthropic
enterprise was envisioned-a hybrid combining the missions of
grantmaking, public affairs, and resource mobilization," 37 which was
focused on the "central ideas of partnership, leverage, and advocacy." 38
As noted, the success of these efforts and the consequent alteration in the
frequency and amount of Turner's donations 39 means that as the tenth
year of the Foundation came and went, Turner's contributions did not
run dry. The remainder of Turner's billion-dollar gift is to be spread out
and "leveraged"-that is, used to solicit new partners who will add
support.40 The goal is to squeeze at least two billion dollars' worth of
work from Turner's one billion dollar donation.41
The importance of UNFIP and the Foundation in building the
U.N.'s partnership capacity is unquestionable. It reflects the remarkable
amount of influence that a large, well-publicized, and savvily
administered gift can have, even on an organization as sprawling as the
U.N. From its earliest reports, UNFIP proclaimed its interest in
evolving into a broader partnership liaison office.42 As it passed its
tenth anniversary, it accomplished the goal, spawning the Office for

remittances to the implementing partners.") [hereinafter UNFIP Seventh Year Report], availableat
Memorandum of Understanding
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/seventhA-60-327.pdf;
Between the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships and the _ [Party name to be filled
parties"),
http://www.un.org/unfip/docs/
between the
VI.4
("Relation
in], art.
UNFIP MODEL MOU.pdf [hereinafter Sample Memorandum. ("Implementation and Use of
Funds") ("To the extent possible and consistent with U.N. Regulations and Rules, UNFIP shall
recover and return to the Foundation all misused funds."). Id.
35. U.N. Secretary-General, UnitedNations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, 29, U.N. Doc. A/54/664 (Dec. 10, 1999) [hereinafter UNFIP Second Year
Report] ("The UNFIP/[Foundation] effort has evolved considerably over the course of its second
year of operations."), available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/secondyear-a-54-664.pdf.
36. Id.
37. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 19.
38. Id.
39. Preston, supra note 18, at 1-2.
40. Id.
41. See Press Release, U.N. Foundation, Ted Turner's United Nations Foundation Delivers $1
Billion to U.N. Causes, Foundation Makes New Commitment to Leverage Another $1 Billion U.N.
Press Release (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.unfoundation.org/media-center/press/
2006/pr _101006.asp.
42. See, e.g., UNFIP Third Year Report, supra note 33, T 46 ("The UNFIP-[Foundation]
partnership has evolved considerably over the course of its third year of operation."); UNFJP
Second Year Report, supra note 35, 1 25 ("The UNFIP/[Foundation] effort has evolved
considerably over the course of its second year of operations.").

270

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:261

Partnerships to which some of its roles are now entrusted. As noted, the
Office for Partnerships is now the gateway provider ofpartnership
But with
expertise to potential entities in the U.N. and outside of it.
several overlapping staff and officers between UNFIP and the Office for
Partnerships, UNFIP's deep involvement in the project of building U.N.
partnerships remains clear. 4 Furthermore, the Office for Partnerships'
advising capacity was built while it was part of UNFIP. 4 5 In a 2004
report, UNFIP noted that it "is increasingly becoming a service provider
to the United Nations system in its facilitator role with private
companies and civil society. Particularly in the last two years, there has
been a significant increase in the number of enquiries for partnership
assistance."46 This trend has held. The number of "substantive
enquiries" surpassed four hundred only two years later, 4 7 and by 2007,
the number was "almost 700."48
In sum, and largely thanks to Turner and his organization, the U.N.
is increasingly trusted by potential donors and partners and viewed as a
reliable conduit for philanthropic investment. UNFIP and now the
Office for Partnerships point to their experience in administering over a
billion dollars' worth of total gifts through Foundation partnerships,
most of the funding of which did not come from the Foundation itself
43. UNFIP's eighth report explained that "[t]he partnership with the United Nations
Foundation has enabled UNFIP to evolve into the partnership office of the United Nations. It
provides advisory and facilitation services to United Nations system organizations and a one-stop
shopping centre for potential external partners with the United Nations." U.N. Secretary-General,
Nations Fund for InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the Secretary-General,1 52, U.N. Doc.
A/61/189 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter UNFIP Eighth Year Report], available at
6
The
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Dos/UNFIP%202005%20Report%/ 20-%2OA- 1-189.pdf.
used
similar language to
own
name,
under
its
issued
report
Office of Partnerships, in the second
describe its role. See 2008 Report, supranote 28, 15.
44. See id. Annex I.
45. For instance, UNFIP was involved in tsunami relief efforts in 2005-2007, when "[tihe
United Nations Foundation .. . leveraged significant partner funding by expanding its fiduciary role
in partnerships with organizations such as the American Red Cross and other charitable and
commercial entities and by facilitating direct contribution from the general public." UNFIPEighth
Year Report, supranote 43, 45. This work seems to have been accomplished in large part simply
by making the managerial, accounting, and development resources of the Foundation and UNFIP
available to partners and donors. UNFIP's capacity proved useful in other situations: "In light of
its ability to provide fast track programme management processes and expeditious administrative
support and oversight, UNFIP was tasked with the establishment and executive management of the
new fund for democracy-building efforts worldwide, UNDEF." UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra
note 43, T 70; see also id. 149-50.
46. U.N. Secretary-General, UnitedNations Fundfor InternationalPartnerships: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, 55, U.N. Doc. A/59/170 (July 23, 2004) [hereinafter UNFIP Sixth Year
Report], availableat http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/sixthA-59-170.pdf.
47. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supranote 43, 1 52.
48. 2008 report, supranote 28, 5.
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but from its many partners.49 The U.N.'s partnership capacities now
include the coordination of U.N. entities with governments, for-profit,
and nonprofit actors; the administration of large scale financing and
logistics for global projects; and, just as importantly, the provision of
U.N. bona fides and largely favorable publicity to donors and partners. 50
All of this capacity-which has been well noted in the donor/partner
pool, judging from the precipitous rise in "substantive enquiries"5 1
derives ultimately from Turner's gift and the U.N.'s active embrace of it.
Established partnerships like that between the Foundation and UNFIP
provide tested and reliable models, and the Foundation has not hesitated
to claim its share of credit for the evolving partnership model. Timothy
Wirth noted about his organization that "[w]e have become ... a kind of
broker for the increasing number of people in the private sector who
want to engage with the UN."52 Institution building may be just as
lasting a legacy as the substantive projects of the Foundation, and the
Foundation and UNFIP have adjusted their methods and aims in light of
this fact. They have, in essence, realized that the role of "influential
partnership broker" represents a significant enhancement even over the
role of "well-heeled partner." As they approached their tenth year,
UNFIP and the Foundation reconceived their role to be one of
facilitation and coordination of additional partnerships.5 3
In sum, the Foundation/UNFIP partnership has initiated changes in
the nature, organization, and functioning of the U.N., as in similarly
situated international organizations. The change has the potential to help
the U.N. achieve some of its most ambitious goals-but also to make the
organization vulnerable to capture. Powerful partners play a significant
and increasing role in the work of the U.N. and on the international stage
more generally. And partnership facilitators have gained a toehold
within the hierarchy of organizations.

49. Id. 128.
50. Id. 2-4.
51. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, 52.
52. Timothy E. Wirth, Remarks Before the U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force on the United
Nations (Apr. 25, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutionsfiles.org/unfwebsite/PDF/speeches/USIPremarks.pdf).
53. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, 1 66 ("The difference in the level of grant
approvals between the seventeenth [$46.3 million] and the eighteenth [$1.5 million] funding rounds
[the 2005 funding rounds] reflects a new way of operating by the United Nations Foundation.
Rather than invest exclusively in projects or programmes, the United Nations Foundation Board
decided to consolidate future investments by thematic area and use their core resources to build
partnerships and lead advocacy campaigns in support of key themes.").

272

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:261

These developments are evaluated from a critical perspective in the
following Part of this Article. For now, it suffices to note that the
Foundation's development and relations with the U.N. have challenged
the U.N. system to evolve. Partnership activities are increasingly
important within the U.N. Foundation/UNFIP activities have had the
effect of bringing about significant growth in the U.N.'s capacity to
provide legal and logistical support to multi-party efforts involving new
types of hybrid entities and coordinated teams (public/private,
profit/nonprofit).
Some of these changes were anticipated at the
establishment of the Foundation and UNFIP, and still more have arisen,
with unanticipated strength, over time.
Apart from substantive
contributions to the environment, security, children's health, and
reproduction/population issues, Turner has contributed both procedural
templates and a measure of goodwill for partnership-type activities with
the U.N. system and among potential partners.
This Part has focused on Turner's gift, and the remarkable shortand long-term effects it has had on the U.N. The Foundation, however,
is not a lone actor. It provides only one important example of a much
broader phenomenon: a sharp rise in public-private partnerships in
public international organizations. 54 Numerous public international
organizations, especially those dealing with development, have in their
own ways heightened their engagement with partners.55 But the

54. See Kaul, supra note 14, at 219 (developing elaborate definition and classification of
global public-private partnerships, based on empirical work); id. at 239-41 (answering the question
of whether the phenomenon of public-private partnerships is a "[flad or fixture?" in favor of the
latter); Ian Broadwater & Inge Kaul, Global Public-PrivatePartnerships: The CurrentLandscape
(United Nations Development Programme/Office of Development Studies Working Paper, Feb.
2005) (discussing evidence of the rise of partnerships).
55. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO), the public health arm of the U.N.,
which currently lists "Enhancing Partnerships" as one of its six top agenda items. See THE WHO
AGENDA, http://www.who.int/about/agendalen/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). They have
also faced, and introduced some protections against, reputational costs arising from their partnership
activities. See, e.g., Press Release, WHO, Statement of the World Health Organization on
Allegations of Conflict of Interest and "Fake" Pandemic (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/hlnlpandemic 20100122/en/index.html
("WHO recognizes that global cooperation with a range of partners, including the private sector, is
essential to pursue public health objectives today and in the future. Numerous safeguards are in
place to manage conflicts of interest or perceived conflicts of interest among members of WHO
advisory groups and expert committees."). See also Thomas C. Dawson & Gita Bhatt, The IMF and
Civil Society Organizations: Striking a Balance (2001), IMF Policy Discussion Paper, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2001/pdp02.pdf; International Monetary Fund, Factsheet:
The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/civ.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010). In addition, dozens of U.N. entities, particularly the larger ones, are
developing their own specialized partnership offices and capacities. See, e.g., International Labour
Office (ILO) Committee on Technical Cooperation, Public-Private Partnerships, GB.301/TB/1 (Jan.
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Foundation's relationship with the U.N. was an early model for-and
instigator of-this wider phenomenon of global partnerships, and it
provides an apt illustration of benefits and possible drawbacks of the
emerging partnership paradigm.
III. PROBLEMS OF "PARTNER CAPTURE"
This Part presents dangerous downsides, for public international
organizations, of the sharp rise of public-private partnerships, a rise
illustrated here by the example of the partnership activities of the U.N.
and Turner's U.N. Foundation. This Article coins "partner capture" as a
general term to describe the dangers of a headlong rush into
partnerships.
The term partner capture derives from the concept of "agency
capture" in the U.S. regulatory and administrative context, but as will
become clear, partner capture covers a broader range of bureaucratic
pathologies than agency capture. The analysis here looks to a range of
principles concerning the behavior of public agencies, interest groups,
and other actors in regulatory processes-principles initially identified
by legal scholars, economists, and political scientists writin in the areas
of public choice, political economy, and administrative law.

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed-norm/--at
available
2008),
28,
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_090364.pdf. See also Alison Kamhi, Note, Private
Fundingfor Public Justice: The Feasibility of Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal, 48 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 581 (2007) (applying lessons from other public-private partnerships, including U.N.
Foundation, to the international tribunal set up to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders; emphasizing
financial transparency and the need to prevent donor manipulation of tribunal operations).
56. For introductions to the relevant concepts, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991), especially at 12-37 ("Interest Groups
and the Political Process"), and 116-44 ("Integrating Public Choice and Public Law"); Michael E.
Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward
a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). For examples of "agency capture" and related
concepts integrated into focused scholarly studies, see, for example, Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1064-69 (1990) (discussing standard
"capture theory"); Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339-46
(2001) (outlining theories in the course of an assessment of a trend in greater presidential control of
executive agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV.
421, 448-52 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SC. 335, 336-39 (1974) (casting some doubt on suspicions of bureaucratic incompetence);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669
(1975) (providing critical historical overview of major trends, theories, and results of the first
several "stages" of U.S. administrative legal structure, with a focus on judicial review); Thomas H.
Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: PresidentialPower, Congressional
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional
Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 121-26 (1996) (modeling structures of decisionmaking
applicable to U.S. government actors). For an influential, more expansive account, see JERRY L.
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This Part focuses on several distinct dimensions of partner capture:
(A) agenda distortion, that is, the potentially disruptive agenda-setting
power that heightened partnership activity brings with it; (B) intraorganization rivalries, i.e., the structural effects that the competition for
partnership funds and for control of joint activities might have on the
organization as a whole; (C) reputational risks that flow from certain
alliances or activities; and (D) erosion of legal immunity that might
result from actions taken in concert with partners or with their agents.
The theoretical basis of this critique is drawn from scholarship on
agency failure and bureaucratic design initially developed to explain the
pathologies of the modem administrative and regulatory state. The
application of these primarily public choice insights to international
actors, such as international organizations, has been attempted only in
fits and starts. However, as this Article demonstrates, there is an
ongoing need for political economic analysis of international
organizations, international law, and global governance, particularly in
the hyper-politicized, big business of development.5 7 As international
law-or what is better termed the law, regulation, and administration of
"global governance" regimes--continues to develop at the instigation of
non-traditional (i.e., non-state) actors and in non-traditional (i.e., nontreaty and non-"customary international law") forms, it will continue to
demand the attention of legal scholars wielding legal tools appropriate to
complex, novel, and evolving problems. Scholars, for instance those
proposing a set of core accountability principles forming an emergent
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE:

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW

(1997) (extensive, contextualized application of public choice concepts in U.S. government
structure and function, with a focus on administrative agencies, and with a normative push for
extensive delegation, and well-developed checks).
57. See, e.g., Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of InternationalOrganization, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH 27, 36-

40 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991) (discussing political economy of international
agencies' behavior as regards governments and interest groups); Roland Vaubel, The Political
Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A Public Choice Analysis, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS, supra, at 204 (providing an

example of

international organization behavior under conditions of expensive oversight, arguing that staff selfinterest determines at least certain organization policies); Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation
Under Anarchy: States, InternationalOrganizations,and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION
& AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 41

(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006)

(introducing basic concepts of principal-agent theory as applied to international organization).
These are merely some starting-points; the remainder of the essays in both of the cited volumes
provide useful frameworks and case studies. See also Philip Jones, Taking Self-Interest into
Account: A Public Choice Analysis of InternationalCooperation, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE:
RESPONDING To GLOBAL CHALLENGES 304 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceicao eds., 2006) (providing

background on international public choice, and on partnerships and other global collaborative
forms); id. at 314-15 (discussing bureaucratic behavior).

2011]

PARTNER CAPTURE INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

275

"global public law" or "global administrative law," have emphasized the
need for process-based protections, interest-based analyses, and attention
to internal institutional rules and accountability structures.58 This
Article's account of partner capture provides a concrete example
supporting these scholars' intuitions. The Article's proposal is an
example of how academic observations can be applied in practice.
For the purposes of this Article, a key analogy is between public
international organizations and the traditional agents that much
administrative law seeks to control: the executive agencies responsible
for regulating in the public interest in their given fields. This analogy is
apt because public international organizations-by contrast to many
other NGOs and international organizations, and to private entitiesexist to advance the interests of their member-states, with responsibility
delegated to them by these states on the basis of their expertise and
ability to aggregate disparate interests in favor of collectively feasible
and efficient solutions. This ideal is never fully attained, but without a
sense that international organizations operate on a basis of expert
analysis responsive to the interests and aims of the member-states, their
effectiveness and credibility are greatly undermined. 5 9
To further elaborate the dominant analogy of this Article, private
partners such as the Foundation are akin to interest groups in traditional
administrative law, in that they are entities that operate in the general
field of an organization's concern but on the basis of interests that are
58. See Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in MORAL
UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167 (Henry R. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009) ("I
argue that international law should be theorized as the law between public entities outside a single
state . . . I focus . . . on the entities whose practice counts in making international law, on the

processes whereby these entities make international law, and some implications about the content of
international law."); Benedict Kingsbury, Richard B. Stewart & Nico Krish, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 34-35 (2005) ("Internal Mechanisms
Adopted by Global Institutions for Participation and Accountability"); Benedict Kingsbury et al.,
Foreword Global Governance as Administration-Nationaland TransnationalApproaches to
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) ("Global Administrative Law
encompasses the legal mechanisms, principles, and practices ... that promote or otherwise affect
the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet
adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by
providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make. . . . This field of law is
described as 'global' rather than 'international' to reflect . . . its foundation in normative practices,
and normative sources, that are not encompassed with standard conceptions of 'international
law."'); ALVAREZ, supra note 1, at 109-83 ("(Re) Introducing International Institutional Law"),
184-256 ("The Varied Forms of International Institutional Law"); see also supro note 57.
59. See Mona M. Lyne et al., Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in
Development Aid, in DELEGATION & AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at

3 (emphasizing the complexity, when dealing with international organizations, of specifying the
principal whom the agent should obey).
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not necessarily aligned with the public interest, the interest of the
international organization in question, or the interest of its constituents
(usually member-states). As the literature on agency failure suggests,
preserving the functioning of public bureaucracies requires careful
attention to pathologies that will naturally develop in agencies, not due
to bad faith on the part of agency officers but simply due to institutional
pressures and predictable self-interested, utility-maximizing preferences.
The questions that this Part seeks to answer are: What sort of
distorting effects the "pull" of private partnership money might have on
the activities of public international organizations? What are the dangers
of partner capture?
A.

Agenda Distortion

This sketch of partner capture problems for public international
organizations begins with agenda distortion. This problem is the most
pressing and most difficult to detect pathology likely to arise from
partnership arrangements. As the following discussion shows, agenda
distortion is pervasive, in that the other forms of distortion contribute to
agenda distortion inefficiencies in an organization, which distract it from
the goals it would otherwise pursue.
The example of the U.N. and Ted Turner's U.N. Foundation is
again useful. The operations of the Foundation, UNFIP, and the U.N.
agencies "partnering" with them are far from separate. They are
thoroughly entangled. The Foundation wields an immense amount of
influence over project selection. "Projects and activities were identified
in conformity with the Foundation's strategic objectives," notes one
report. Another provides that "[elach Project Document shall be
consistent with the terms and conditions of the corresponding project
proposal package approved by the Foundation."61 And of course final
decisionmaking regarding funding remains in the hands of the
Foundation's Board of Directors.62 The agenda-setting and gatekeeper
power of the Foundation is indubitable, and that is hardly surprising, as
the Foundation supplies (or otherwise arranges) the lion's share of

60. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, T 1.
61. Sample Memorandum, supranote 34, art. 11.2 ("Project Documents").
62. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, 1 48. Also of interest: "Member States will
recall that the programme framework on sustainable energy and climate change was endorsed by the
UNFIP Advisory Board and the [Foundation] Board of Directors in late 2000 and was formally
circulated by UNFIP to United Nations system partners in June 2001." UNFIP Fifth Year Report,
supra note 26, 25. There does not seem to be any opportunity for comment or change by U.N.
agencies or the General Assembly.
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financing for most projects. While UNFIP offers assurances that its
procedures seek to "ensure the full participation of all stakeholders in
decisionmaking," 6 3 the "participation of all stakeholders" will only go so
far if final decisions are subject to approval by the Foundation's board.
All reasonable actors will attend carefully to that board's preferences.
Its priorities will dominate.
The agenda distortion fear is not that the partner or its agents will
actively exploit the international organization's activities for personal
gain-although the Oil-for-Food debacle of the 1990s, in which
widespread incompetence combined with shrewd corruption led to
scandal, serves as a reminder that organizations must remain vigilant
against extreme abuses.64 The primary fear, rather, is that actors with
sufficient money or influence may skew the goals of the organization
away from the priorities its member-states and officers would otherwise
prefer, and turn it instead toward the goals prized by that focused,
motivated, external actor. 65 This danger is more acute when, as with the
U.N., it may be quite difficult to know when the organization's activities
are being distorted. The mandate of the U.N. is extremely broad.66
Agencies and officers have significant discretion to choose the activities
they consider the best use of U.N. resources. It is this balancing of
priorities that partners might affect, and in a way not even necessarily
detectable to the decisionmakers themselves, over time. There are many
arguably appropriate actions it could take in every area of global policy,
and under current arrangements, its partners are likely to exercise
disproportionate influence in determining which of the many available
opportunities win out. Partners have a megaphone that can drown out
the sounds of the other interests whispering in the ear of agency
decisionmakers. Compounding this fear is the likelihood that, given the
contrast between this broad mandate and the limited personnel and
capacity of the U.N., initial "capture" would be magnified as
bureaucratic inertia sets in. That is, once an area becomes a focus, an
agency develops expertise, contacts, and interest in that narrow area, and
-67
it will pursue projects in that area again.
63. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, T 49.
64. SIMON CHESTERMAN, THOMAS M. FRANCK & DAVID P. MALONE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTS & COMMENTARY 558-63 (2008).
65. For comments and bibliography on agenda setting, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
56, at 38-42 and accompanying notes.
66.

U.N. Charter art. 1. For an analysis generally in line with that offered here, see Williams,

supra note 4, at 447-49 (endorsing caution by U.N. in accepting partners and partnerships).
67. Brennen Jensen, 'Winging It' for World Peace: Additional Donors and a Knack for
Teamwork Have Helped Ted Turner's UN. Charity Thrive, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 22,
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The Foundation is but the tip of the iceberg, and by comparison to
other partners it is a model of transparency and philanthropic idealism.
UNFIP, and now its counterpart, the Office for Partnerships, seems
motivated to secure funding from as many-and as wealthy-sources as
possible.68 These activities put the U.N. at great risk of manipulation by
organizations upon whose funding it will become dependent if it wants
to continue growing and expanding its own range of partnership
projects. The long list of corporate partners inevitably raises suspicions
concerning the motives and legitimacy of the cooperation of
multinational corporations with the U.N. Partnerships have been made
with many of the largest and most powerful companies in the world,
including Exxon,69 Citigroup,70 Wal-Mart, 7 Marvel Comics,72 and
Such partners, along with respected philanthropic
Coca-Cola. 73
foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, 74 supply both expertise
and a great deal of money, and are thus indispensable to the trend toward
partnership. 75 A partnership with Vodafone, for instance, was intended
to strengthen emergency communication capacity.76 An advantage of
this type of model, as always with the involvement of private funding in
public ventures, is the increased efficiency that results from a private
corporation, which may be more results- and service-oriented than
bureaucratic, politicized U.N. agencies. That said, such corporations lay
careful global strategies that include consideration of how philanthropic
outlays can enhance business opportunities, and how they may yield less
tangible benefits as well. To embark on mutually beneficial partnerships

2007, available at http://www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/vl9/i09/09002201.htm ("The United
Nations Foundation doesn't just give money to the United Nations, it helps shape the projects inside
the United Nations," says Claudia Rosett, journalist-in-residence at the Foundation for the Defense
of Democracies, a Washington think tank. She adds, "The problem with that is that nobody elected
Ted Turner. He's just rich.").
68. UNFIPEighth Year Report, supra note 43, 153.
69. Id. 16.
70. UNFIPSeventh Year Report, supra note 34, 44.
71. 2008 Report, supra note 28, T26.
72. Id. 21.
73. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, 34 ("in tsunami-affected areas of Thailand,
Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.").
74. UNFIPFourth Year Report, supranote 32, 41.
75. As of the end of 2005, "[t]he cumulative amount of co-financing from other funding
partners [aside from the Foundation] was $360.4 million, or more than one third of all approved
grants." UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supranote 43, 11.
76. Id. 1 60 ("The partnership of the advisory committee of the Vodafone Group Foundation
and United Nations Foundation/UNFIP held its first meeting in October 2005. . . . The
partnership's primary goal is to combine Vodafone funding, knowledge and technology with United
Nations Foundation funding, relationships and programmatic expertise.").
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is precisely the goal, and a laudable one, but it must be remembered that
with active business entities, partnership discussions should be more
"arm's length" than might be necessary with dedicated philanthropic
organizations whose interests are more likely to be aligned with those of
the U.N. The proposed Office of Independent Review in Part III of this
Article would help guarantee non-captured review of proposed
partnerships.
Is there any reason to think that agenda distortion concerns are
anything more than a theoretical concern? Unfortunately, agenda
distortion would be difficult to detect in many cases, because it enters at
such a deep, structural level, of a decisionmaking process marked by
considerable discretion. Accordingly, it is a main argument of this
Article that structural problems demand structural solutions, because adhoc solutions cannot work when individual distortions are difficult or
17
impossible to detect as they arise.
Still, several examples illustrate that agenda distortion is a very real
issue. One established facet of agenda distortion emerges from the
"pull" of outsized foundation funding, and another from the lack of
sufficiently specific "legislative" guidance from the U.N. member-states
empowered to give it.
The activities of the Gates Foundation provide the first example.
The Foundation, the largest in the world, endowed by the fortunes of
both Bill Gates and, recently, Warren Buffett,78 has been active in the
realm of global health policy (among many other areas). It has sought
out creative, broad-based technical approaches to large-scale problems,
and has been lauded for its results-based, analytical approaches. 79it
partners with numerous organizations, including the WHO. However,
it has also attracted bitter criticism for its tendencies to take aggressive

77. In this, it is no different from agency capture. See, e.g., Protecting the Public Interest:
Understandingthe Threat of Agency Capture,Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight
and the Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm., Illth Cong. 5-8 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School), available at
(explaining that "[t]he
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-03-10%2OBagley%20Testimony.pdf
central problem with agency capture is that it is neither easily identifiable nor readily falsifiable.").
78. Timothy L. O'Brien & Stephanie Saul, Buffett to Give Bulk of His Fortune to Gates
Charity,N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at Al.
79. The Gates' Foundation's willingness to explore risky possibilities, in particular, is
consistent with experts' conceptions of what foundations can uniquely add to policy problemsolving. See Frumkin, supra note 21, at 69 ("If successful, foundations can serve as laboratories for
experimentation where new and controversial ideas can be put to the test.").
80. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Gates Foundation'sInfluence Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2008.
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action without taking account of the systemic effects of its projects. 8 Its
vast resources make its priorities and chosen approaches, practically
speaking, irresistible to scientists and organizations in the global medical
arena, and have often left dissenters out in the cold.82 That the Gates
Foundation has arguably used its power for the most part rationally and
innovatively hardly relieves the worry stimulated by its disproportionate
and unaccountable power over the global development agenda in the
arenas it chooses to enter.
Another specifically grounded version of the "capture" criticism of
the Foundation and its U.N. counterparts has been presented by the
influential conservative academic Mary Ann Glendon, a Harvard law
professor who has, among other positions, served as the head of the
Vatican's delegation to the Fourth U.N. Women's conference in 1995.83
In 1999, Glendon wrote that "economic pressures ... may aggravate the

danger of capture of U.N. agencies by well-financed special interests,"
and she cited Turner's then-young Foundation as an example: an
endowment that, upon further examination, "looks less like a gift and
more like a take-over bid aimed at U.N. agencies with privileged access
to vulnerable populations."84 This suggestion was accompanied by
biting personal criticism of both Turner and Foundation head Timothy
Wirth for their alleged passion for population control of the poor.

81. Id.
82. Id. (recounting bitter criticism, leveled by WHO's chief of malaria, of Gates Foundation
malaria policy's effect on other research, treatment, and prevention efforts in the field); Robert E.
Black et al., Accelerating the Health Impact of the Gates Foundation,373 LANCET 1584, May 9,
2009 (noting Foundation's outsize influence in global health policy arena, encouraging move to less
risky, more efficiently lifesaving strategies); Ann Danaiya Usher, Dispute Over Pneumococcal
Vaccine Initiative, 374 LANCET 1879 (discussing charities, including Gates-related entities,
engaging in distortion of reports and pursuing illogical solutions); David McCoy et al., The Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation'sGrant-makingProgrammefor Global Health, 373 LANCET 1645, May
9, 2009 (analyzing and criticizing Gates Foundation grant-making practices). See especially id. at
1650 ("All the key contributors to global health have an association with the Gates Foundation
through some sort of funding arrangement. Coupled with the large amount of money involved,
these relations give the foundation a great degree of influence over both the architecture and policy
agenda of global health.").
83. See Barbara Crossette, Vatican Picks US. Woman As Delegate to U.N. Parley, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 1995), at A3; "Biography," http://glendonbooks.com/biography.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009).
84. Mary Ann Glendon, Foundationsof Human Rights: The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J.
JURIS. 1, 11 (1999).
85. She wrote:
A case in point is CNN founder Ted Turner's $1 billion "gift" to the U.N. announced in
the fall of 1997. . . . [T]his infusion of funds would have ranked behind the annual
contributions of only the U.S., Japan, and Germany. The news seemed too good to be
true. It was. It soon appeared that the U.N. would not have control over the funds.

2011]

PARTNER CAPTURE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

281

The more alarmist edge of Glendon's critique falls short, 8 6 and has
not been borne out in the decade since it was written. Wirth's leftward
leanings are no secret," but no evidence points to his being far out of the
mainstream. As for Turner, he explored direct contribution to the U.N.
but was not "as an individual, able to directly donate to the United
Nations."" As noted, a significant amount of Foundation funding goes
directly into U.N.-wide publicity and promotion. And, importantly,
most current Foundation projects are in line with existing U.N. priorities
and lack strong political overtones.
The "women and population" portfolio is, however, politically
sensitive, and it drives Glendon's critique. UNFIP's description of the
project runs thus:
Projects [in the "women and population portfolio"] approved in
2004 focused on promoting the participation rights of adolescent
girls, supporting policy advocacy relating to reproductive health,
improving the quality of reproductive health care, and
strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to ensure a steady
supply of essential reproductive health supplies to developing
countries worldwide.89

Rather, its agencies would be required to submit proposals for approval by a foundation
headed by a man Mr. Turner chose because "he thinks as I do." The man . . . is former
U.S. State Department official Timothy Wirth, who spearheaded the aggressive U.S.
population control agenda at the 1994 Cairo conference. Wirth has been so zealous in
advocating population control that he has even praised China, with its coercive onechild-per-family policy, for its "very, very effective high-investment family planning."
As for Mr. Turner, he told a California audience in 1998 that in the post-Cold War
world, "The real threat is no longer an army marching on us, it's people infiltrating us,
you know, people that are starving."
Id.
86. For one, Glendon understates Wirth's qualifications by failing to mention his service in
the United States Senate. Wirth, supra note 15, at 15 n.aal. Her further claims largely lack
documentary support; the sources provided for the fragmentary, out-of-context quotations of Turner
and Wirth are insufficient. The China quotation is pulled from a Weekly Standard attack, itself
unsourced, on several Clinton administration figures, including Wirth; the quotation is a mere
fragment there as well. Jeffrey Gedmin, Clinton's Touchy-Feely Foreign Policy, WEEKLY
STANDARD, May 13, 1996, at 19. The Turner quotation about the "real threat" is from a New
Yorker "Talk of the Town" fluff piece, and seems to be overblown rhetoric-Turner is a notorious
loose cannon in his public comments-used to advance his position on nuclear proliferation, not
developing-world population control. Ann Bardach, Turner in 2000? The Media Mogul Converts
Some Rich People, NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 37.
87. See, e.g., Timothy E. Wirth, President, The United Nations Foundation, The Need for
Philanthropic Advocacy, Global Philanthropy Forum Conference on Borderless Giving (June 6,
2003).
88. Jensen, supra note 67.
89. UNFIP Seventh Year Report,supra note 34, 1 15.
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The efforts have taken place in India, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania,
Nepal, Peru, and the United Republic of Tanzania. 90 The Foundation,
UNFIP, and their partner agencies have also embarked upon
"reproductive health care" initiatives in Kosovo.9 ' UNFIP reports have
asserted that "[r]eliable access to contraceptives and other commodities,
such as condoms, HIV/AIDS test kits and equipment for emergency
obstetric care, is a fundamental requirement for reproductive health."9 2
Components of this initiative offend some on moral grounds, but
those offended currently appear to be a minority-a fact for which the
Foundation bears no blame. Its projects remain within the mainstream
of international aid efforts, efforts in this case apparently designed to
empower young women (for whom early marriage or child-bearing are
strongly correlated with destitution) and protect those at grave medical
risk from HIV/AIDS and other diseases.93 In the face of the situation of
young women in states lacking readily available medical facilities or
counseling services, Foundation activities hardly reveal a desire to "buy"
the U.N. for nefarious purposes.
That said, it is true that UNFIP notes religious or morally based
objections only dismissively: "Obstacles to achieving equality include
. . . harmful traditional, religious and cultural beliefs."94 Glendon is
right that the Foundation's activities have enhanced the functioning of
the U.N.'s pre-existing policies and activities in the area she finds
objectionable. Glendon here provides an example of precisely the sort
of agenda distortion partner capture that this Article suggests will arise.
She accurately identifies an area of agenda influence that the Foundation
has had over U.N. programs, in one of its chosen areas of emphasis.
Further, the Foundation's involvement and its promise of independent
funding may have lowered the U.N.'s responsiveness to concerns such
as those Glendon and others might raise, tilting the scales away from
political sensitivity and toward active intervention. 95
90. Id. $ 18.
91. UNFIPFourth Year Report, supranote 32, 12.
92. UNFIP Seventh Year Report,supra note 34, 1 17.
93. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, 1 20 ("Young women in Africa aged 15 to 24
are two and a half times more likely to be infected by HIV/AlDS than young men of the same age.
With the rapid spread of the epidemic in Africa, young married girls are now the group most
vulnerable to infection by older, sexually active husbands.").
94. Population and Woman Program Framework, supra note 31, T 24; see also id T 43
("Additional constraints include opposition to aspects of reproductive health.").
95. In this case, even the name of the program, "women and population," might seem-as if
masking some quasi-Malthusian plot-to view aid to women instrumentally, as a means to the end
of population control, and thus this name seems out of place in light of the practical human needs
being fulfilled, which might incidentally ease some global population difficulties, but which is
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While most observers might favor the tilt in this case, future
"tilting" might swing the other way, and to much more extreme positions
than the largely mainstream ones pursued by the Foundation.
Substantive outcomes do not excuse procedural sloppiness. Safeguards
against extremism should be desirable to all.
In the end, although Glendon unfairly attacks Turner's "gesture" as
a mere "take-over bid," it is hard to argue with the claim that the shift to
partnership funding and activities represents, in Glendon's words, a sort
of "testing for the U.N. if its prestige and organizational resources are
not to be, literally, for sale."9 Glendon's point supports the argument
that, in the partnership context, U.N. entities may be willing to approach
their tasks differently, if not always on a substantive policy level then at
least on the level of rhetoric and process, when given cover by partners.
If this is true, this is a loss of independence that should worry
international organizations.
All this admitted, and with agenda distortion worries given full
airing, the question still arises: How does partner capture distortion
differ from the types of agenda distortion already built into U.N.? The
U.N.'s "democracy deficit" is often discussed, without any remedy in
sight.97 And, by contrast to many inscrutable actors within the U.N.
(including its most powerful body, the Security Council), the Foundation
transparently promulgates annual reports and publicizes its aims,
making them easy to subject to public discussion. While the danger of
capture may be endemic to the U.N., it may not be fatal to the U.N.'s
overall effectiveness, including in partnership situations. If the choice is
between, on the one hand, carefully policing the U.N.'s partnerships for
manipulation or self-dealing but allowing the partnerships to continue, or

absolutely certain to lead to other desirable outcomes such as opportunities for education and
employment as well as lowered risks of abuse and disease. A better chosen name might give a more
accurate impression of the types of programs that the Foundation, the U.N., and their partners have
supported-programs which are largely unobjectionable, and desperately needed. This is the way
the "programme framework" presents the issue, with humanitarian concerns foremost, followed by
a note that population issues are secondary benefits that would lead to long-term humanitarian

benefits. See, e.g., Populationand Woman Program Framework,supra note 31, 1 22 ("Helping to
fulfil [sic] the human rights of adolescent girls is an area of emphasis both because of the
improvements it can make in the lives of individual girls, and because of its important consequences
for human and economic development.").
96. Glendon, supranote 84, at 11.
97. See THOMAS D. ZWEIFEL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRACY:
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICS, AND POWER 59-84, 82 (2006) (concluding that absent significant

international political restructuring, "the U.N. is likely to remain as it is today:
government, but a place where sovereign states can negotiate their interests.").
98. UNFIPPreliminaryReport, supranote 4, 1 23, Annex.

not a quasi-
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on the other hand greatly restricting the mandate and capabilities of the
U.N. to enter partnership, who could in good conscience choose the
latter? Partners bring a lot to the table. And U.N. entities address too
many urgently pressing needs to restrict involvement in such situations.
While it may be true that much of the private funding behind such
efforts would still be dedicated to aid even without U.N. involvement
(e.g., by the Red Cross), both the scope of the U.N. as an organization
and the inclusive global ideals it represents militate in favor of it being
an umbrella organization for aid efforts where possible. Any solution to
partner capture problems should take care not to hinder the positive
aspects of partnerships when it seeks to curb the negatives.
One solution to agenda distortion would be to ramp up the
"legislative" guidance given by the General Assembly, the Security
Council, and other relevant member committees within the U.N. system,
to "executive" actors in U.N. agencies and the Secretariat. 99 This
solution would evoke a different set of administrative law principles,
under which U.N. agencies would merely be "transmission belts" for
putting "legislative" guidance into action.10 0 However, this possible
solution seems likely to face the same unhappy fate suffered by the
analogous U.S. model: near-total neglect. This solution would involve a
much greater commitment by members to funding the programs they
specify, because foundations and other entities will be less likely to
participate if their input is not as central to decisionmaking. It would
also require significant steps to be taken toward the development of
more representative models within the U.N., for instance, the
development of weighted voting mechanisms to deal with the democracy
deficit and ground decisions in popular will. These are steps that might
make many states uncomfortable, and would in any case require
member-states to overcome inertia to a degree that seems unlikely. Thus
this option remains only a distant possibility.

99. See James Q. Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1967 at 3, 8
("When we define our goals, we are implicitly deciding how much, or how little, of a bureaucracy
problem we are going to have. A program with clear objectives, clearly stated, is a program with a
fighting chance of coping with each of the many aspects of the bureaucracy problem. Controlling
an agency is easier when you know what you want.").
100. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 437, 440 ("The traditional model's answer was to treat the agencies essentially as subordinate
adjudicatory bodies that are subject to close statutory and judicial control. Administrative law
functioned as a 'transmission belt' to legitimate the exercise of regulatory authority by ensuring, via
judicial review, that particular impositions on private persons had been statutorily authorized by the
democratically elected legislature.").
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In the end, there remains a very present danger of capture, of
distortion of priorities, and of myopic focus on the pet causes of a given
donor, particularly one as powerful as the Foundation. There is no need
to hold a Pollyannaish view of human nature or motivations. Strategic
behavior is inevitable. Some U.N. agencies may pull punches in their
criticisms of multinational corporations either because the agencies
currently receive funding or because they hope to be part of
Foundation/UNFIP partnerships. Protections can be instituted against
retaliation for such criticism, and this Article proposes a crucial
structural protection, but the problem is always likely to persist to some
degree. We may doubt that UNFIP and Office for Partnerships
guidelines, which claim as their "purpose ... to facilitate the formulation
and implementation of co-operation between the United Nations and the
business community in a manner that ensures the integrity and
independence of the Organization,"1ot will be entirely successful at
policing the activities of these sprawling, active organizations. The
current structure is ripe for manipulation, as it relies on a small number
of agenda-setting decisionmakers, at least some of whose main
qualification for the job is their willingness to put up money. It is
detailed analysis, competing political or philanthropic advocacy for
other positions and agendas, and most of all, structural changes such as
those proposed in Part III of this article, that will blunt the influence of
any actors who would seek to overturn the proper priorities of an
organization like the U.N., while still harnessing partnerships' great
capacity for furthering U.N. goals.
B.

Intra-OrganizationRivalries

The previous section dealt with the way in which external actors
(the Foundation and its staff, Vodafone, Exxon, and so on) might
manipulate the partnership relationship to impose their priorities on the
U.N. agencies engaged in partnership activities, thereby distracting them
from more pressing activities. It asserted that structural changes are the
appropriate first steps for the U.N. to take.
This section deals with another potentially negative effect of greatly
increased partnership activities, namely the way such partnerships can
lead to strategic behavior on the part of entities or individuals within the

101. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidelines on Cooperation Between the U.N. and the Business
at
available
11.6),
(Section
I
at
2000),
17,
(July
Community
[hereinafter
http://www.un.org/unfip/docs/Guidelineson%20UN-Business%20Cooperation.pdf
Guidelines on Cooperation].

286

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:261

organization, utilizing partnerships as opportunities for aggrandizement
of themselves and their offices within the organization. This empirebuilding is especially worrisome in sprawling, relatively ill-defined
bureaucracies like the U.N., but it will be a factor that any organization
should consider before engaging with powerful partners.
In the case of the U.N., for example, there are two directions in
which the rivalries can develop: There is (1) the vertical rivalry by
which the Office of the Secretary-General, which plays the most
important managerial role in the U.N.'s partnerships, could seek to
consolidate its power over the organization by enhancing the
prominence of partnership activities, an arena where it exerts
disproportionate control; and (2) the horizontal rivalry by which entities
or individuals within the U.N. could seek to aggrandize themselves,
exert pressure on peer entities, and so on, by using their relationship to
partners and exploiting the unique opportunities that high-powered
partnerships present.
As a backdrop, note that in considering whether rivalries will
significantly disturb an organization's health, the size of potential
partnership activities is crucial. The potential for partnerships must
exert a significant "gravitational pull," relative to the size and
cohesiveness of the organization, before the intra-organizational rivalry
effects are likely to reach a worrisome dimension. In the case of the
U.N., the size of partnerships relative to the size and cohesiveness gives
grounds for worry. Despite its visibility and sweeping mandate, the
budget of the U.N. is modest, compared to the budgets of the
governments of sovereign states or even municipalities-famously, the
U.N.'s core operating budget is less than that of the Tokyo Fire
Department.102 The core budget was approximately $1.25 billion in
2001, and the entirety of additional resources from both voluntary and
assessed contributions, for core, peacekeeping, and other agency
activities, was less than ten billion dollars in 2000.103 In view of these
figures, Turner's gift, originally announced at approximately one
hundred million dollars per year,104 is large. Further, partnership
funding is for discretionary purposes, whereas basic expenses and
overhead consume most of the core budget. Finally, in recent years the
Foundation's funding has been more than doubled by the involvement of

102. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 137. On U.N. financing more generally, see
CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 201-34.

103. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 133.
104. UNFIP PreliminaryReport, supranote 4,

1.
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other financial and operational partners. os Little wonder then that the
competition for grants has been stiff.106
In view of increasing partnership activities, and the increasingly
accepted role of partnerships in U.N. operations, there is little doubt that
partnership funding exerts "gravitational pull" on the operation of U.N.
actors. In competing for partnership funding, agencies seem less and
less "agents" of member-states than policy entrepreneurs fulfilling
independent mandates.
The increasing numbers of partnership
applications evinces the pull of partnerships, and the resultant horizontal
rivalry concern is that U.N. agencies will sell out, or at least water down,
their agenda in order to attain or retain the alliances with partners that
bolster their place in the U.N. system-to the detriment of other
agencies who would opt to forego some partners in order to preserve
their mission. Such rivalries might make coordinated efforts and
multifaceted projects even harder than they already are within the
fragmented U.N. system.
Again, as with the agenda distortion discussed in the previous
section, such problems would be hard to detect (no one will admit this,
and it would be hard to prove), therefore again this Article argues that
structural safeguards such as those presented in Part III should be
implemented. Intra-organizational rivalry problems are a manifestation
of well-known agenda coordination ("system-wide coherence")
problems within the U.N. system, which have drawn extensive high
level attention in the last decade, including multiple General Assembly
resolutions, a report from the Secretariat, and findings from a high-level
expert panel.' 0 7
To a degree, UNFIP has already admitted its pull over U.N.
agencies, as when it noted that "the U.N. Foundation has sought to help
to bring the U.N. community together, fostering cooperation within and
among agencies, and especially supporting U.N. efforts to encourage
collaboration in the field."' 0 8 The claim is striking: an actor external to
the organization claims responsibility for rearranging relationships
Stated optimistically, the
among actors within that organization.
Foundation may bring more rather than less unity, compared to the
105. 2008 report,supra note 28, 1 28.
106. See, e.g., UNFIP Third Year Report, supra note 33, 1 13.
107. See U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 631311 on
System- Wide Coherence Related to OperationalActivities for Development: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral,
U.N.
Doc.
A/64/589
(Dec.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/developmentactivities221209.pdf (essays analyzing history and
theory of U.N. Secretariat).
108.

U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIvE YEARS, supranote 13, at 14.
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chaotic existing state of affairs within the U.N. And the claim is
plausible, given that the U.N. has long been known to struggle along as a
set of "warring fiefdoms." As with the agenda distortion problem, it is
possible that rivalry problems were already so pervasive that partnership
pressures actually strengthen the organization by providing focus and
rewarding at least rudimentary cooperation. As outlined below, a virtue
of the proposed Office of Independent Review is that it would not
dampen these positive partnership effects but would enhance them by
promoting more attention to potential efficiencies of inter-agency
cooperation.
By contrast to the difficulty of establishing where and when
horizontal rivalry pathologies have developed, there is little doubt that
the increasing prominence of partnerships has had vertical rivalry
effects, for better or for worse. Simply put, partnership activities
significantly expand the power, within the U.N. system, of the SecretaryGeneral, and it strains credulity to think that the Secretariat has not, as a
consequence, actively fostered the trend to partnership. The Secretariat
relies on few certain sources of power under the U.N. Charter, and it has
been up to individual Secretaries to shape the office.109 Kofi Annan
staked out clear ground for himself and his office, taking up much space
in the public eye. He argued that the work of the Secretary, and thus the
work of the organization for which he was the "chief administrative
officer,"o10 was hindered by inadequate support from member-states, the
Security Council, and the General Assembly.Il The Secretariat need
not be a mere figurehead; rather, it has shown promise of being an entity
that could take on an important coordination and agenda-setting role
within the system.
The Foundation, UNFIP, and the Office for Partnerships, are
strongly aligned with the Secretariat. As a matter of legal positioning, as
noted above, the UNFIP was "[diesigned as the operational arm of the
109. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 132-60 (summarizing responsibilities and
capacities of the Secretary-General, pointing out tensions between conceptions of the office as more
"secretary" or more "general"); KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 119-20 (noting the role of
occupants of the office and offering a brief account of its developments and current status);
THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN WORLD POLITICS (Simon
SECRETARY OR GENERAL?
Chesterman ed., 2007).
110. U.N. Charter art. 97.
111. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security,
and Human Rightsfor All: Rep. of the Secretary- General,U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005);
CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 143-51 (appealing for greater resources and autonomy to be
given to the Secretariat); KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 137 (noting ways, including
partnerships, in which Kofi Annan sought to use his position to "creative[ly]" put the U.N. on better
financial footing).
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Secretary-General in its partnership with the United Nations
The report on UNFIP's 2004 operations noted
Foundation."112
revealingly "with the unprecedented response to the global commitments
of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals
from the private sector and civil society leaders all over the world, the
Office of the Secretary-General will be increasingly accountablefor
facilitatingtheir engagement and that of other constituencies.""3
Time and again UNFIP and Office for Partnerships documents refer
to the "priorities of the Secretary-General," 1 1 4 or to action taken "[i]n
direct response to the Secretary-General's call-to-action,"" 5 or to "a
commitment that is consistent with the emphasis placed by the
Secretary-General."16
Documents refer to other agencies (UNDP,
UNICEF, WHO, etc.), but always within the rubric of broad direction
from the Secretary-General.
By contrast, the main U.N. membership body, the General
Assembly, as well as its associate committees, receives much different
mention in partnership documents:
Designed as the operational arm of the Office of the SecretaryGeneral in its partnership with the United Nations Foundation,
UNFIP . . . continues to work with the intergovernmental

machinery, including the General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council. UNFIP remains committed to playing a vital role
in global partnership development within the Secretariat.117
The phrase "intergovernmental machinery" revealingly sounds like a
burden to be shrugged off-an obstructive, rusty bureaucratic apparatus
compared to the energy and flexibility of the Secretary-General and
UNFIP reports and other partnership-related documents
UNFIP.
demonstrate that the Economic and Social Council and the General
Assembly are marginal actors at best in partnership activities. Memberstates, particularly the powerful and rich ones who enjoy holding the
purse-strings and calling the shots for the U.N., may eventually become
uncomfortable with the expansion of partnership activities if this trend
broadens; they might even, in a sort of vicious cycle, view increased

112. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supranote 34, 59.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. 37.
115. UNFIPFourth Year Report, supranote 32, 38.
116. UNFIPSixth Year Report, supranote 46, 36.
117. UNFIPEighth Year Report, supranote 43, 73.
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partnership funding as an excuse to shift funding away from the U.N., to
118
more responsive international organizations or to domestic organs.
As noted above, the extremely broad mandate of the U.N. provides
the perfect opportunity for entities and individuals to steer the day-today work in the direction they desire.119 In this case, it is strongly in the
interest of the Secretary-General, who is otherwise dependent on the
whims of member-state diplomacy and politics, to build mechanisms of
funding and support that will allow his office to direct the broad and
crucial work of the U.N. effectively.
The Secretariat's emerging priorities in this arena accord with a
growing understanding among policy experts that development and
security are linked not only to traditional "public goods" like legal
systems but also to investment and private sector involvement.12o As a
result, "[t]he relationship with the business community has become more
important as the role of business in generating employment and wealth
through trade, investment and finance has grown and as U.N. member
states have increasingly stressed the importance of private investment in
development."l21 Many partnerships serve the interests of the individual
U.N. actors involved, whose role within the organization is strengthened
by the emphasis on partnerships. This is particularly true for those who,
like the Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General, are positioned
to exercise agenda-setting power to coordinate disparate activities and
pursue coherent policies. The virtues of coordination, particularly in
light of the ineffectiveness and hyper-politicization of the Security
Council and General Assembly, may outweigh the downsides of the
"vertical rivalry" distortions that come from increasing partnership
activities. That granted, rivalries remain another dimension on which
abuses can occur, and structural safeguards again are necessary.
C.

ReputationalRisk

Even if the U.N. preserves its agenda and maintains structural
balance in the face of increased, centrifugal partnership pressures, can it

118. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supranote 5, at 137 ("Fundamentally ... states are reluctant
to see the U.N.'s dependence on them for its financing reduced too much because that would reduce
their ability to control what the U.N. does."). The distortive effects of certain member-states may,
of course, equal or eclipse the distortions produced by partnership activities, but proposing remedies
for the intractable problem of member-state manipulation of the U.N. exceeds the scope of this
Article.
119. See U.N. Charter art. 1.
120. See Kambi, supra note 55, at 587-88.
121. Guidelines on Cooperation, supranote 101, § 1(3) at 1.
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withstand the pressure on its reputation and legal status presented by its
many alliances? The concern has been present from the start of the rise
in partnerships. The original Foundation agreement with the U.N.
features a section providing rules for use of the name and emblem of the
U.N., a concern also manifested in more recent "Guidelines on
Cooperation." 2 2 The Foundation drafted "Good Governance Policies"
that show explicit awareness of need to guard against "reputational risk
to the UN" in light of the Foundation's "partnership commitment to the
UN."l23 The concern reflected consistently in legal documents from the
origins of the Foundation and UNFIP down to the present is for the
Current
responsibility, reputation, and independence of the U.N.
"Guidelines on Cooperation" used in structuring partnerships emphasize
that "[a]rrangements should not diminish the U.N.'s integrity,
independence and impartiality." 24
In tension with this caution, however, are the many public
documents (statements, speeches, press releases, reports) trumpeting the
U.N.'s partners and activities.125 The U.N. benefits from the publicity,
in that it presents itself as a dynamic organization efficiently leveraging
private funds to fight the world's fight; on the other hand, the partners
benefit far more, on the symbolic level. The link with the U.N. and its
"blue helmet" credibility provides an enormous boost to multinationals
whose reputations are not always spotless. The U.N. does not appear to
have taken due account of the fact that, in addition to its experience and
capacity, the U.N.'s reputation is a key2 part of what it brings to
This is another sphere in
partnerships-and what it stands to lose.

122. Id. § V at 2-3. The potential for embarrassment due to the U.N. Foundation's name has
caused some adjustment in the Foundation's operations already. In additional to aid activities, the
Foundation engages in substantial public advocacy, and UNFIP has broadened its involvement in
The
Foundation work by recruiting other organizations to partner with the Foundation.
Foundation's advocacy takes place most under the auspices of its "sister organization" the Better
World Campaign, which it describes as a "vocal cheerleader[] for the United Nations and its
causes." U.N. Foundation at Five Years, supra note 13, at 21. The Better World Campaign might
better be described as an arm of the Foundation rather than as a sister organization, because it is
indistinguishable from the Foundation in all but name. A distinct name was presumably
necessitated by the unseemliness of an organization called the U.N. Foundation, the name of which
might make it appear to be an arm of the U.N., cheerleading for the U.N. Early on, this advocacy
yielded fruit in the form of payment by the U.S. of much of its overdue debt to the U.N. Id. at 22.
123. U.N. Foundation Good Governance Policies § 4, http://www.globalproblemsglobalsolutions-files.orglgpgsfiles/unf website/PDF/GovernancePolicies andProcedures.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
124. Guidelines on Cooperation, supranote 101, § IV at 2.
125. See Preston,supranote 18, at 1-2.
126. On a theoretical level, it bears mentioning that the governments of member-states may
consider reputational damage to the U.N. as damage to their interests mostly because as the U.N. is
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which an Office of Independent Review's assessment of potential
partners and partnerships should be required before that reputation is put
at stake. The fear is that partnership activities, if hindered by some
unforeseen catastrophe or by corruption, may expose the U.N. to
devastating reputational harm, the cost of which will be borne primarily
not by the partner but by the U.N. The fallout from such an incident
could significantly impede the organization's ability to pursue its
mandate, including its entering into other partnerships.
These fears have not been realized-if they had, something like the
proposals in this Article would certainly have been implemented already.
But the potential is undoubtedly present. It takes little digging to
discover certain inconsistencies in partnership activities. In 2008, for
instance, just before the United Nations Development Fund for Women
put out a report favorably discussing a class-action lawsuit that accuses
Wal-Mart of pervasive gender discrimination,127 the Office for
Partnerships released a report lauding a partnership with Wal-Mart:
In 2007, under the guidance and support of the UNOP, WalMart became increasingly engaged in supporting United Nations
causes, especially the efforts of the United Nations Development
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to end violence against women. WalMart has committed its intent to collaborate with the United
Nations on the issue of gender-based violence and on specific needs
for women in the workplace environment, specifically in large
factories and major suppliers of Wal-Mart throughout the world. 28
The Office for Partnerships made no mention of the lawsuit, noted
so prominently in a UNIFEM publication, that surely provided
inspiration for Wal-Mart's sudden spate of philanthropy in the arena of
women's issues.

robbed of reputational capital, and that will both, of course, hamper the future effectiveness of the
organization, but also will limit the available reputational capital that the governments can use in
making the organization "an alibi or scapegoat" for tough policy decisions and activities that are
unpopular domestically. See Jones, supra note 57, at 307 ("If the agencies' activities damage
electoral support, they are inclined to blame international agencies.").
127.

ANNE MARIE GOETZ ET AL., PROGRESS OF THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2008/2009, WHO

ANSWERS TO WOMEN? 66 (2009) (Discussion titled: "Seeking to Hold Wal-Mart Accountable for
Gender Discrimination"). The case is Dukes v. Wal-Mart, most recently affirmed in part and
remanded in part upon en banc rehearing by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
at 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).
128. 2008 Report, supranote 28, 126.
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Erosion of Legal Immunity

Damage to the U.N. from partnerships gone bad might be more
than symbolic or reputational; partnerships test the bounds of the U.N.'s
legal immunity in countries in which it operates. The original agreement
between the U.N. and the Foundation specifies that partnerships should
not threaten the U.N.'s immunity,129 mentioning the issue twice:
29. The parties hereby acknowledge and agree that the
Foundation is an entity established under United States law and
separate and distinct from the United Nations and that it shall not
be considered, for any purposes whatsoever, as having a legal status
connected with or dependant upon the United Nations. The
personnel, agents or contractors of the Foundation shall not be
considered in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever as being
the employees or agents of the United Nations, nor shall any
personnel, representatives or other affiliates of the United Nations
be considered, for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees or
agents of the Foundation.
32. Nothing in or relating to this Agreement shall be deemed a
waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities
of the United Nations, including its principal and subsidiary
organs. 130
Similarly, the Office for Partnerships' "Sample Memorandum of
Understanding" asserts that a partner organization "shall not be
considered as an agent of the UNFIP," 131 seeking thus to avoid legal
complications arising out of agency relationship.
While there do not seem to have been any controversial situations
as of yet, these conclusory statements that partnership does not
compromise U.N. immunity or subject it to liability risks might not
avail, should a cause of action arise from the work of a partner.
Although public international organizations are generally well-protected
by immunity doctrines from most forms of liability in domestic courts,
and although the U.N. operates under an even more favorable set of
immunities than most other international organizations (it is protected by

129. See UNFIP PreliminaryReport, supra note 4, 1 12 (noting that the Advisory Committee
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions specifically requested a change to the agreement to
preserve this immunity).

130. Id. Annex.
131. Sample Memorandum, supra note 34, art. V.
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a separate immunity agreement 32), the more attenuated the control of
organizations over their agents, and the more they share control with
partners, the more they risk exposing themselves and their employees to
liability. Most courts remain reluctant to pierce jurisdictional immunity
of international organizations and their employees directly, but some are
willing creatively to circumvent that immunity where necessary.1 33 The
doctrinal rationales for immunity weaken as an organization becomes
more closely entangled with private actors, wanders further from its core
activities, or appears to have already bartered away some of the
independence that immunity doctrine is in part intended to assure.134
132. On the immunity and legal responsibility of the U.N., see CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note
64, at 515-39 ("Immunity and Responsibility"); on international organization immunity generally,
see Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Immunity Enjoyed by Officials of States and International
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 387, 404-11 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003); AUGUST
REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (2000) (providing
detailed cases and discussion of rationales and holdings regarding immunity of international
organizations); KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 114-25,
208-19 (2002) (discussing, from a remedies perspective, the application and rationale of immunity
doctrines); Davinia Abdul Aziz, Privileges and Immunities of Global Public-PrivatePartnerships:
A Case Study of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV.
383, 409 (2009) (arguing, after helpful analysis based on a particular type of partnership, that
privileges and immunities "for global public-private partnerships should be strictly streamlined to
purpose").
133. WELLENS, supra note 132, at 120 ("Issues concerning the immunity of international
organisations are primarily matters of international law ... but the decision as to its scope normally
rests solely with the forum state." (footnotes omitted)); REINISCH, supra note 132, at 174-75
(presenting some case law bearing on the issue of immunity extended to those exercising delegated
authority and contractors, making clear that the law remains unsettled and untested). Alleged
international human rights violations provide an example of the increased perceived need for access.
3
For discussion and case law, see id. at 281-305; see also id. at 321 nn.12-1 (citing cases in which
"attempts [were made] to challenge measures of international organizations before international
human rights organs," and characterizing these cases as "witness[ing] [a] growing tendency of
trying to hold international organizations accountable.").
134. See WELLENS, supra note 132, at 125 ("Allowing claims brought against international
organisations to be litigated would not only contribute to another public perception of international
organizations, but also certainly substantially improve their accountability regime."); REINISCH,
supra note 132, at 233 ("The paramount rationale for granting immunities to international
organizations . . . lies in securing their independence and guaranteeing their functioning.").
Reinisch comments:
[1In assessing whether or not domestic courts should refrain from adjudicating disputes
involving international organizations, policy considerations, in particular the following
two, should be taken into account more closely:
1. the prevailing rationale for abstention, on the one hand, is the necessity for
ensuring that international organizations are able to fulfill their functions independently
without any outside influence; and
2. on the other hand, it seems to be crucial that the vindication of 'civil rights and
obligations' of private parties vis-A-vis international organizations as well as of
international organizations themselves is sufficiently guaranteed.
Id. at 392.
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One worrisome case, for example, could arise if a nominal employee of
a public international organization were to work so closely with a
partner that a court considered the employee to be an agent of the
partner, beyond the scope of the organization's immunity protections.
As with other public international organizations, the U.N.'s liability
shield is thick-but not, perhaps, as wide as it might hope. At the very
least, the legal theories underlying "partnership" of this nature should be
elaborated in official documents and followed in practice.
Of course, the Office for Partnerships already has an incentive to
minimize any legal and reputational impact: "bad" partnerships,
attracting negative attention or eroding U.N. immunities, would prove
costly to the Office that approved them. Still, the collective cost to the
U.N. as a whole would vastly outweigh any costs to the individual
officers reprimanded or fired; the risk of reputational or liability costs of
the Office's over-promotion of partnerships is largely externalized on
the entire U.N. system. Practically speaking, it is far from apparent that
given its apparent pro-partnership orientation, the Office has due
awareness of the grave risks here outlined, nor does it necessarily have
the resources to address them.
IV. A PROPOSAL: THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW
The Foundation and UNFIP have proclaimed again and again that
their relationship has changed the way the work of the U.N. is conceived
both within the U.N. and among non-governmental actors in the forprofit and non-profit realms. 135 Their claim is no exaggeration, although
the previous Part argues that the rise of partnerships carries risks in
addition to rewards. The U.N.'s experience with the Foundation and
many other partners has brought significant growth in its capacity for
partnerships, and this shift falls in line with the widespread rise of civil
society and private sector influence in the international law and policy of
development, security, and regulatory coordination. By contrast, the aid
community historically had little trust in the U.N. to serve as an
efficient, innovative, or reliable conduit for funding and projects.' 36
Long overdue, this change may hold great promise for more efficient,
accountable, and politically-insulated aid activities in the future.

135. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supranote 13, at 11.
136. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 372 (noting the preference, among "[w]ealthy
countries," for non-U.N. institutions for their "development funding"). "[T]he U.N. system and its
agencies were simply never trusted by the donor community to the extent that the [World] Bank and
the [International Monetary] Fund were." Id. at 373.
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As part of this broad change, legal controls should continue to
evolve, to allow room for this sort of adaptation while remaining true to
the basic commitments and values enshrined in the Charter and other
fundamental documents. No new institutional structure can completely
eradicate this tension, and continued change and contestation should be
expected as part of the natural process of adapting a large public
institution to a changing world. Still, there are strong steps that could
and should be taken by the U.N.-as by other similar organizations-to
streamline partnership activities and guard against their pitfalls.137 This
Part proposes one important step-the establishment of an Office of
Independent Review (OIR)-and explains what the mandate of this new
entity should be.
This paper proposes that the OIR be tasked with the following
responsibilities: (1) similarly to the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (especially its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs),13 8
analyze proposed partnerships and produce organizational impact reports
to enhance cooperation across agencies and to coordinate various
partnership efforts so that they efficiently advance strategic goals; (2)
develop best practices for partnership agreements and activities, by
evaluation of previous partnership efforts; (3) similarly to U.S.
Inspectors General,1 39 investigate and report on allegations of
malfeasance and other manipulation or exploitation by U.N. entities or
their partners; (4) ensure the compatibility of partnership ideas and their
means of execution with U.N. ideals and goals, by prospective review of
proposed partnerships; (5) insist on as much transparency as is feasible,

137. As discussed in this Part, the implementation of these steps would be in line with steps
taken of late by other international organizations to bolster accountability. See, e.g., Kingsbury,
Stewart & Krisch, supra note 58, at 34-35 ("Internal Mechanisms Adopted by Global Institutions
for Participation and Accountability"). Here as elsewhere on the global arena, uncritically
embracing the free-form intervention of private partners might not be efficient from a policy
perspective. See, e.g., David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006) (critiquing
another form of public-private collaboration-informal, horizontal network-based administrative
rule ("best practices") development-in the domestic and global spheres).
138. Of course, these organizations are themselves hardly immune from criticism. See
generally GELLHORN & BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 609-25, 638-58,

698-705 (Strauss et al. eds., rev. 10th ed. 2003) (basic documentary history of OMB and OIRA, and
some critique); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIous CIRCLE:

TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK

REGULATION 68-72 (1993) (basic explanation and critique of role of OMB and OIRA in modern
regulatory process).
139. See generally Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts:
Creatingan Office of the Inspector General,35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243, 243-52 (1999) (basic history
of offices of the inspectors general in federal agencies); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING
GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (extensive

history of inspectors-general movement up to the early 1990s).
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from U.N. entities and partners; (6) solicit and take account of comments
from affected parties and members of the public concerning
partnerships; and (7) regularly review the overall role of partnerships
within the U.N. system to ensure that partnerships, and the possibility
they present for institutional rivalry and aggrandizement, do not distract
the Secretariat or individual agencies from their prescribed roles-or
from pursuing the most efficient fulfillment of these roles.
To ensure independence in these activities, the OIR would have to
be sealed off from the rest of the Office for Partnerships, in terms of its
hiring, staffing, procedures, and substantive judgments. Its head would
have to answer either to the Secretary-General directly--or, given the
worries about Office of the Secretary-General aggrandizement, to
another high-level official or entity unaffiliated with the other U.N.
partnership entities. Further, in order to maintain its own credibility and
accountability, most of its work should be made public, subject to
confidentiality considerations.
Because its tasks are heavily oriented toward accountability, the
OIR would liaise with existing U.N. entities responsible for monitoring
and improving U.N. operations, for instance the Office of Internal
Oversight Services,140 Board of Auditors,141 Joint Inspection Unit,142
and Evaluation Group.143 But it should be separate from these entities,

140.

UNITED

NATIONS

OFFICE

OF

INTERNAL

OVERSIGHT

SERVICE,

http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) ("The Office assists Member States and
the Organization in protecting its assets and in ensuring the compliance of programme activities
with resolutions, regulations, rules and policies as well as the more efficient and effective delivery
of the Organization's activities; preventing and detecting fraud, waste, abuse, malfeasance or
mismanagement; and improving the delivery of the Organization's programmes and activities to
enable it to achieve better results by determining all factors affecting the efficient and effective
implementation of programmes.").
141. UNITED NATIONS BOARD OF AUDITORS, http://www.un.org/auditors/board/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2010) ("[T]he accounts and management operations of the United Nations and its Funds and
Programmes are required to be audited and reported on periodically by independent external
auditors [i.e., the Board of Auditors].").
JIU,
About
U.N.
System,
of
the
Unit
Inspection
Joint
142. The
http://www.unjiu.org/en/about.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) ("The Unit is composed of not more
than eleven Inspectors appointed by the General Assembly on the basis of their special experience
in national or international administrative and financial matters . . . . They are mandated to provide
an independent view through inspection and evaluation aimed at improving management and
methods and at achieving greater coordination between organizations.").
143. About U.N. Evaluation Group, http://www.uneval.org/about/index.jsp?ret-true (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010) ("UNEG ... has 43 members. Membership is institutional with the Units
responsible for evaluation in the UN system, including the specialized agencies, funds, programmes
and affiliated organisations, eligible for membership. These Units should have, or aspire to have,
the required professional knowledge, experience and responsibility for evaluation as defined by the
UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2005).").
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which are spread thin, have been subject to embarrassment and criticism
of their own, 144 and are primarily focused on post-hoc evaluation or ex
ante establishment of general principles rather than being incorporated,
structurally, in real-time decisionmaking. OIR's unique focus and role
in partnership decisions would best be preserved by maintaining its
independence from these organs as well.
Finally, while its opinion would naturally carry weight, nothing is
to say that the OIR should necessarily have veto power over partnership
activities; rather, its opinions should be viewed as persuasive authority,
with ultimate decisionmaking in tough cases left up to higher-level
Cumulatively over time, OIR reports likely would be
officials.
persuasive, and its role as independent evaluator would cheapen
monitoring costs by member-states and lead to more effective oversight
of the U.N.'s exercise of delegated powers.145
OIR's partnership-restricting, "gatekeeper" function should be
balanced by its project-generative capacity. Ideally, OIR's analyses
would stimulate partnership ideas by suggesting directions in which
there is untapped potential for some types of donors to work with U.N.
partners. Agenda creep would then work in favor of U.N. interests
rather than against them, which is the current risk.
An additional project-generative side of the proposed OIR
procedures is that member-state government entities might respond to
heightened accountability and rationality in partnerships by greater
willingness to commit resources and expertise to partnerships. By
contrast, without the assurance, the "political cover," provided by a
credible independent review, government entities might face legal or
policy obstacles to involvement in partnerships. Removing the taint or
suspicion of partnership might encourage partnerships while rooting out
manipulative or distortive actors or projects and discouraging "bad
behavior" by partners and agencies.
An important question is why these functions must be delegated to
a new office rather than simply promulgated among existing entities and
coordinated by the existing Office for Partnerships. In support of this
objection is the fact that creation of a new office is a classically

144. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 540-97.
145. As a policy matter, of course, I do not argue or suggest that states, as members of the
General Assembly, necessarily make better policy than private foundations and other partners, or
than the Office of the Secretariat. But structurally, as the U.N. is currently organized, memberstates bear responsibility for U.N. agenda-setting and project management, so enhancing their
effectiveness in this role is a goal that internal U.N. law, such as that proposed here, should pursue.
Of course, the proposal has other benefits, as noted, that go beyond accountability to member-states.
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inefficient, bureaucratic way of compounding the existing bureaucratic
risks and inefficiencies:146 a cure worse than the disease.
After all, there have not been any serious, public problems with
partnerships so far, despite over ten years of intensive partnership
efforts. U.N. agencies have been put on notice that they should remain
wary of possible problems arising from partnership activities.147
Additionally, since its inception, the Foundation/UNFIP partnership has
been well-documented, transparent, and perhaps even too bureaucratic in
setting its guidelines.148 Its actions seem to have been diligently tailored
so that it could serve as a trustworthy model, to give assurance that
money funneled through U.N. programs and partnerships would not be
wasted or ill-spent:
As we have worked to secure new partnerships, we also serve as an
effective steward of resources for UN causes and have established
secure systems of financial accountability and oversight with the
care and transparency necessary to satisfy all participants. As a
result, the UN Foundation has won a reputation as a flexible,
responsible conduit for funding UN causes.149
So it is true in many ways that "Ted Turner's visionary approach
now serves as a model for other partners to engage in United Nations
causes."15 0 For instance, drafters of partnership agreements are referred
to U.N. Foundation agreements and procedures as a model.1 51 Indeed,
as noted, the practices of the Foundation and its U.N. facilitators have
facilitated a huge growth in partnerships.
The fact that so much has gone right so far is a tribute to the
transparency and publicity of partnership activities over more than a
decade, as well as the care and responsibility exercised by the U.N. and
Their practices send a message that these
Foundation officials.
organizations are seeking to be legally above-board, accountable, and
clear about the terms of their relationships. Institutionally, as was noted

146. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE

DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1-31 (1995) (introducing unintended consequences, in U.S.
government, of well-meaning application of "principles of administration" as (failed) antidote to
government sprawl and loss of accountability).
147. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, § VII(19)(b) at 4 ("Within each [U.N.]
organization, a focal point should be nominated to ensure transparency, learning and a better
understanding of the role and objectives of business and to ascertain whether they are compatible
with the goals of the UN.").
148. See Fifth Year Report, supra note 26, 11.
149.

U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supranote 13, at 75.

150. UNFIP Sixth Year Report, supranote 46, 166.
151. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, Annex 2 at 6.
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in Part II, the increase in partnerships may have improved the efficient
functioning of the U.N. by encouraging salutary rivalries among
agencies for good, new ideas, as well as funneling power to the
Secretariat, which can most effectively coordinate activities. (In this
respect, the proposed OIR differs from the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, which at least in part exists to further the agenda-setting and
policymaking power of the chief executive. 152)
These objections to the creation of a separate office are powerful,
and perhaps for some organizations of less scope and sprawl than the
U.N., ad-hoc solutions would be enough. But for an organization such
as the U.N., accountability must be structurally built in, or it cannot be
meaningfully present for the long term. There are too many ways in
which problems of agenda distortion, destructive rivalries, and even
reputational and legal liabilities, can hide themselves for a time or
forever. As the deterioration they cause goes undetected, the problems
can pile up-the processes of agenda distortion, reputation decline, and
structural malformation are problems that once entrenched are difficult
to reverse. The operative general principle here is that problems that
cannot be detected and corrected as they arise must be addressed by
preemptive, structural safeguards. Furthermore, to rely on self-policing,
or policing by partners, ignores the very nature of the problem of
"partner capture," which is that the incentives for partners, and for their
U.N. contacts, will be precisely to pursue the sort of dangerous behavior
outlined in the previous Part of this Article. Only a truly independent
office would have the incentive both to become fully informed about the
effects of individual partnerships on the U.N. as a whole and to act on
that information-ultimately, to ensure that U.N. resources are indeed
leveragedby partnership activities, not divertedby them.
The OIR should not be established solely out of fear or suspicion of
outside entities that might "infect" the U.N. or any other international
Of course, the U.N. should
organization with alien priorities.
aggressively protect itself against corruption, capture, or selfentrenchment, and the OIR would have capacity for such protection.
But more than simple policing is needed. The OIR would provide a
focal point for consideration of the directions in which growth can and
should occur. Ultimately, the goal of the U.N. as of all international
organizations should be to ascertain the best ways in which activities can
be conceived, organized, and funded-whether by governments or by

152.

See GELLHORN & BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 138, at 615.
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private partnerships or by some other way as-yet-undeveloped-to
advance its lofty mandate.
V. CONCLUSION

The rise of public-private partnerships has proven a boon to public
international organizations, whose broad mandates but limited budgets
But the
lead them too often to disappoint public expectations.
enthusiastic response of these organizations should be tempered with an
awareness of the new types of responsibilities incumbent on the
organizations when extending their reach with partnerships. Lessons
from similar situations encountered by other bureaucracies may be a key
to adjusting to this new role effectively. Both philanthropies and
international organizations have passed through several stages of
evolution already, and as both sets of players shift into increasingly
important roles on the global stage, a further step toward rational
structure, coordination, and evaluation is merited.
As this Article has demonstrated, both the partner capture problem
and its solution connect with a broader movement in international law,
which has begun to recognize that new forms of effective global
regulation and governance cannot be allowed to outstrip the
implementation of the safeguards against abuse that have developed in
domestic law. Legal guidelines and high-minded mandates are not in
themselves enough; rather, international actors must establish soundly
designed accountability institutions and mechanisms to keep pace with
increasing delegations of responsibilities to international organizations
and networks. This discussion of how to prevent partner capture
supplies one example of the potential of international law to develop
beyond its traditional sources and forms and to become more effective
by drawing on domestic analogues, grounded in theory and practice, that
can provide reliable guidance in addressing new challenges.

